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1. Introduction
The concept of intimate partner violence comprehends all those physical, sexual, and psychological harming
behaviors perpetrated against girls and women by their intimate partners during the course of their private lives.
Nowadays, this form of violence is present in every country, and it spreads across age ranges, cultures, races,
and socioeconomic levels. Far from being eradicated, the scale of the problem still remains at highly concerning
levels, and has become a major issue within the agenda of international organizations and governments around
the world.
Mexico is one of the countries of the world in which intimate partner violence represents a more serious
problem. Indeed, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, 2011), around eleven
million of Mexican women report having experienced at least one violent episode during their lives as a couple. In
particular, 25.8% of them mention to have suﬀered some form of physical violence; 11.7% confess the occurrence
of episodes of sexual abuse; and around 89% report having been subject to some sort of psychological violence
from their intimate partner.
The latter ﬁgure is of special relevance for the aim of this paper. Despite the fact that more social and
political awareness is often raised around physical and sexual violence due to their more tangible character, the
impressive levels of psychological abuse reported by Mexican women have made this sort of violence become a
core piece in the policy-making of the country in the last couple of decades. This is probably why, most recent
laws and other legal instruments aimed to tackle intimate partner violence already count with particular sections
solely dedicated to the analysis and prevention of psychological abuse within the couple.
1.1. Research Question and Contributions to the Field
Although the enactment of legislative and executive measures has been a common tool used by the Mexican
government in the ﬁght against intimate emotional abuse in recent years1, this paper aims to investigate the
potential eﬀect that other public interventions such as gender-oriented cash transfer programs can have on the
reduction of this form of violence among Mexican couples.
In particular, this study investigates whether or not, participation into the social program Oportunidades is
likely to signiﬁcantly alter the prevalence of psychological violence among those couples that beneﬁt from the
program. The direction of such an eﬀect, when existent, is analyzed as well.
Existing economic theory seems to agree that conditional cash transfer programs in which funds are given
1As a matter of example:
Law of Assistance and Prevention of Intra-Family Violence in Mexico City (Ley de Asistencia y Prevención de la Violencia Intrafa-
miliar para el D.F; 8 Agosto 1996)
General Law on the Access of Women to a Life Free from Violence (Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de
Violencia; 19 Diciembre 2006)
Mexican Regulation on Family, Sexual, and Violence Against Women (Norma Oﬁcial Mexicana sobre Violencia Familiar, Sexual y
contra las Mujeres; 29 Noviembre 2007)
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to women tend to improve women's status within the power structure of their households (Adato et al., 2000;
Quisumbing & Maluccio, 1999), but no ﬁnal conclusions have been reached on how this improved position relates
to the exhibition of violent behaviors from their couples. Indeed, the results obtained by current research on
the relation between participation into Oportunidades and the prevalence of intimate partner violence among
Mexican couples are scarce and considerably mixed. While certain authors ﬁnd a positive correlation between
participation into the program and a reduction in the probability of women of suﬀering physical abuses from their
couples (Angelucci, 2008; Bobonis & Castro, 2010), empirical ﬁndings with respect to psychologically violent
episodes are not that optimistic (Bobonis, Castro, and González-Brenes, 2013).
Accordingly, this study aims to throw some light on the issue by contributing to the existing literature in
two diﬀerent manners.
First, the empirical analyses presented in this paper use a novel indicator of intimate partner violence that
has not been used before: the extent to which a woman actively participates in making decisions relative to
the use of contraceptive methods. By using this variable as an indicator of women's suﬀering of psychological
abuse, this study aims to reduce the chances of obtaining downward biased estimates of the program impact
on the prevalence of intimate partner violence. In fact, feelings of shame and fear of retaliation are less likely
to inﬂuence responses regarding the use of contraception than those relative to the suﬀering of more explicit
violent behaviors such as being beaten or coerced to have sexual relations, which provides more reliability to the
outcome variable of interest (Chin, 2012; Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013).
Secondly, this study is ﬁrst in using household and community-level data on the Mexican Family Life Survey
to evaluate the impact of Oportunidades on the prevalence of intimate partner violence among Mexican couples.
The unique panel structure of the survey, which follows Mexican individuals between 2002 and 2005, facilitates the
combination of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach with more traditional propensity score matching techniques,
which provides an element of additional consistency to estimates of the program's impact that has not been
achievable before.
My results show that women in households that are eligible for participation into Oportunidades are more
likely to actively participate in making decisions over the use of contraceptives, which indicates that they are
subject to lower levels of psychological abuse by the hands of their intimate partners, in comparison to women
residing in non-eligible households. This eﬀect becomes larger when households' status of actual participation
into the program is taken into account. Nonetheless, further robustness analyses demonstrate that the existence
of a signiﬁcant association between eligibility/participation into Oportunidades and intimate partner violence
exclusively holds within the urban setting, but cannot be assured for the case of rural households.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the speciﬁc concept of intimate partner
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violence that constitutes the basis of this study. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework that supports
this investigation. Section 4 introduces the program Oportunidades and its implementation process. Section 5
describes the data and methodology used in the analysis, while Section 6 provides the main empirical results.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Intimate Partner Violence: Psychological Abuse and Women's De-
cision on the Use of Contraceptives
Following the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993), the term
domestic violence comprehends any act of gender-based violence that takes place in private life and results in
physical, sexual, or psychological harm to girls and women. The deﬁnition is therefore restricted to those acts
of violence that take place within the family, and excludes those that occur in public life. When this deﬁnition
is further restricted as to solely focus on those violent behaviors perpetrated by women's intimate partners and
no other family members, the speciﬁc concept of intimate partner violence arises (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002).
Intimate partner violence can take considerably diﬀerent forms, which range from physical abuse (murder,
beating, stabbing, slapping...) and sexual harassment (coerced sex), to more subtle forms of psychological
mistreatment. Although physical and sexual violence tend to raise greater social and political awareness due to
their tangible component, the signiﬁcant prevalence of psychological forms of abuse among domestic partners
should not be underestimated.
Psychological violence2 includes all sorts of attitudes that are intended to intimidate and subordinate the
woman to the man, and that tend to eventually leave her in a powerless position within the household (Cheston &
Kuhn, 2002; UNICEF, 2000). Thus, there exist a wide range of behaviors prone to be classiﬁed into the category
of psychological violence3 (Bobonis & Castro, 2010), but this paper particularly focuses on the diminished
participation of women (in relation to that of their intimate partners) in the decision-making process on the use
of contraceptives. Figure 1 graphically depicts the existing relations among all the aforementioned concepts in
order to facilitate their understanding.
Impeding or eroding women's participation in the negotiation and decision-making of key issues for the
development of their personal lives is one of the most basic forms in which men can psychologically abuse their
intimate partners. Thus, denying women the possibility of negotiating safer sexual relations and the use of
contraceptive measures to achieve their desired fertility goals is a clear indicator of emotional abuse (UNICEF,
2000). Despite its signiﬁcance, and as far as I am concerned, using women's decision power on the use of
contraceptives as an indicator of the suﬀering of emotional violence from their intimate partners is a novelty
2Also referred to as emotional violence.
3For example: scarring, humiliation, insults, forced isolation from relatives and friends...
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Figure 1: Psychological Abuse and Women's Decision-Making Power on the Use of Contraceptives
Source: Original from author
within the literature. This seems paradoxical, because establishing the extent to which a woman is prevented from
making her own decisions on the use of contraceptives as a measure of intimate partner violence is particularly
beneﬁcial for one special reason: self-reported responses to questions about contraceptive choices are likely to be
more reliable than those to more direct questions about other violent behaviors such as being beaten or coerced to
have sexual relations. Nowadays, most currently available data on the perpetration of violent behaviors against
women by their intimate partners is widely considered highly unreliable (Chin, 2012; Garcia-Moreno et al.,
2006; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013; UNICEF, 2000). Given the delicacy of the topic, and even disregarding common
threats to household survey information such as question design and sample representativeness, questionnaires on
this type of violence are believed to contain a considerable degree of inaccurateness and bias on their responses.
Feelings of shame and fear of further episodes of violence often make women refuse to answer certain questions,
and when responses are given, these are likely to under-report the frequency or intensity of violent behaviors
perpetrated by their intimate partners.
In conclusion, one of the main contributions of this paper is that it uses the degree of a woman's participation
in the decision-making process on the use of contraceptives as an indicator of her potential suﬀering of emotional
abuse from her couple. By doing so, this study aims to reduce the chances of obtaining downward biased
information on the incidence of intimate partner violence, a problem that commonly arises when outcomes
of interest are constructed from self-reported responses to delicate questions such as those relative to violent
behaviors within the household.
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3. Gender-Oriented Conditional Cash Transfers Programs and Inti-
mate Partner Violence
The theoretical framework under which this paper develops is graphically summarized on Figure 2, and as it
can be seen, it builds on two diﬀerent sections of the economic literature. First, those studies that demonstrate
that participation into a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in which funds are disbursed to women have
a positive eﬀect on the position occupied by women within the power structure of their respective households.
Second, a section of the literature that investigates whether this improved status is likely to have a signiﬁcant
impact on the degree of intimate partner violence which the woman is subject to, and if so, the potential direction
of that eﬀect.
3.1. CCTs and Women's Intra-Household Status
Due to the inter-relatedness of a wide range of diﬀerent economic, social, and cultural variables, disentangling
which factors determine the power position of a women with respect to other household members is an extremely
complex task. Nonetheless, most studies on the topic agree with the idea that enlarged economic opportunities
for women have an undeniable inﬂuence on the improvement of such a position (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002; Heise,
2011; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 1999; UNICEF, 2000). For these authors, control over an increased amount
of economic resources in hands of women generates signiﬁcant changes on the existing relations of power and
decision-making among the members of the household. By providing more resources to her family, the perceived
status of the woman within the household changes, her bargaining-power increases, and so does her level of
participation in the decision-making process of certain family-related issues.
One of the most common ways by which women in developing societies can experience a considerable in-
crease in their available economic resources is through the participation into CCT programs in which funds are
exclusively disbursed to women. These gender-oriented CCTs, widely spread throughout Latin America in the
last decades, build on the belief that directly handing cash to women is likely to generate larger improvements
in children's education and health than if it were men who eventually controlled the granted resources (Adato
et al., 2000; Thomas, 1990; Vyas & Watts, 2009), which makes them a powerful tool to reducing poverty and
increase human capital in developing countries (Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013). But, despite the original intention
of such a peculiarity in the design of these sorts of programs, gender-oriented CCTs increase the amount of eco-
nomic resources in hands of women, and consequently have a key inﬂuence in the modiﬁcation of those women's
intra-household status.
Besides granting increased economic resources to the female head-of-household, gender-oriented CCTs are
8
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Figure 2: Gender-Oriented CCT Programs and Intimate Partner Violence: Theoretical Framework
Source: Original from author
susceptible to further reinforce the power status attained by women in other indirect manners as well. One of
them is the fact that the receipt of cash amounts coming from these interventions is subject to the fulﬁllment of
certain obligations by the beneﬁciary women. In most occasions, these requirements take the form of periodical
and highly formative information sessions, which not only improve women's education in certain topics of social
awareness, but also enable them to interact with other women and share common experiences and concerns. By
doing so, CCT programs are likely to improve the conﬁdence and self-esteem of participant women, and thus,
reinforce the intra-household empowerment eﬀect already generated by the receipt of monetary transfers (Adato
et al., 2000).
Empirical evidence across countries in Latin America demonstrates such a positive association between
participation into CCTs and women's improved intra-household status. For example, participation into the
Brazilian program Bolsa Familia has been demonstrated to considerably increase women's bargaining power
with respect to schooling and health decisions for children, as well as to the purchase of certain durable household
goods (de Brauw et al., 2013; Suarez & Libardoni, 2007). In the same way, Gitter and Barham (2008) utilize
randomized experimental data from the program Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua to demonstrate that
participating women have a more active role in making decisions regarding food purchases for the household.
An increase in participation in consumption-related decisions is also found in the case of beneﬁciary women
of the program Chile Solidario (Larrañaga, Huepe, & Marinho, 2009). Finally, Adato et al. (2000) use data
on the Mexican program Progresa to defend that beneﬁciary women have higher chances of participating in
9
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the decision-making process regarding children's schooling and household's large purchases than non-beneﬁciary
mothers.
3.2. Women's Intrahousehold Status and Intimate Partner Violence
Despite the positive eﬀects that participation into gender-oriented CCT programs seems to have in the reinforce-
ment of women's perceived intra-household status, the direction of the relation between this improved position
of power and women's experience of violent behaviors from their intimate partners is far from straightforward.
On the one hand, one section of the economic theory defends that women that do not heavily economically
depend on their couples and beneﬁt from a more equal power balance with their intimate partners are less likely
to suﬀer from episodes of violence by hands of the latter (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 1997; Bobonis, Castro, and
González-Brenes, 2013). These authors base their hypothesis on traditional theories of the family in which men
choose the level of violence to perpetrate towards their signiﬁcant mates that maximizes their personal utility.
In the same way, the degree of violence that women are willing to accept from their intimate partners depends on
both the income ﬂows transferred by their couples and the utility they perceive they could obtain by leaving their
current relationships. When a woman's position within the power structure of the household strengthens, the
utility obtained from her partner's transfers decreases, the perceived utility of leaving the relationship increases,
and the violence level that she is willing to accept falls. Thus, according to these authors, interventions that have
the ability to signiﬁcantly improve the power position of women within their households (for example, CCTs)
would have the potential to reduce the probability of those women of suﬀering from any form of intimate partner
violence. In particular, beneﬁciary women would be expected to participate more actively in the decision-making
process over the use of contraceptives than non-beneﬁciary women, or what is the same, to be subject to lower
levels of psychological abuse from their couples.
On the other hand, another section of the literature relies on what is known as extractive or instrumental
models on domestic violence (Bloch & Rao, 2002; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013) to defend a positive relationship
between women's increased intra-household status and the suﬀering of intimate partner violence. These authors
defend that by gaining a more powerful intra-household position, women are likely to challenge the implicitly
established gender norms of the couple, which supposes a threat to the previously dominant position of the
male partner. Men in this sort of situation are more prone to turn to violence as a way to reinstate their role
within the household and in relation to their wives, which can then lead to more frequent and intense abusive
behaviors towards their partners (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002; Macmillan & Gartner, 1999; Vyas & Watts, 2009).
Consequently, these authors defend that programs that enable women to reach a more powerful intra-household
position by means of increasing their economic possibilities could unintentionally increase their chances of being
somehow abused by their partners. According to these theories, women that beneﬁt from gender-oriented CCTs
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would be less likely to participate on decisions over the use of contraceptives than non-beneﬁciary mothers,
which would be an indicator of the higher levels of intimate psychological violence to which they are subject.
Current research on the relation between participation into gender-oriented CCTs and the prevalence of
intimate partner violence is extremely scarce and restricted to certain Latin American countries. Even where
empirical evidence does exist, results are inconclusive, and corroborate the mixed predictions made by the
economic literature. For example, while diﬀerent evaluations of the Peruvian intervention Juntas seem to
demonstrate that participation into the program signiﬁcantly reduces women's probabilities of experiencing
physical and psychological abuses from their couples (Jones, Vargas, & Villar, 2007; Molyneux & Thomson,
2011; Perova, 2010), results are not that optimistic in the case of other CCTs. In fact, Hidrobo and Fernald
(2013) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between participation in the program Bono de Desarrollo Humano in
Ecuador and the experience of intimate partner violence by beneﬁciary women, whereas Molyneux and Thomson
(2011) provide female testimonies of having been victims of this type of violence as a result of their participation
into the Ecuadorian program. In the case of the Nicaraguan program Red de Protección Social, there is no
evidence of signiﬁcant changes in intimate violent behaviors associated to participation in the program (Adato
& Roopnaraine, 2004; Maluccio & Flores, 2004).
With respect to Mexico, certain authors use ﬁrst-hand qualitative information to assure that participation
into Progresa cannot be related to increased episodes of violence against women within their households (Adato
et al., 2000; Escobar & González de la Rocha, 2005). These statements are corroborated by Angelucci (2008) and
Bobonis and Castro (2010), who use experimental data from the evaluation of Oportunidades to demonstrate
that participation into the program signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of women of suﬀering physical abuses
from their couples. Nonetheless, Bobonis, Castro, and González-Brenes (2013) specify that although program
participation reduces the probability of suﬀering physical violence in the short term, this negative association
seems to disappear between ﬁve and nine years since the ﬁrst cash transfer. Moreover, these positive results
do not hold in relation with psychological violence, which presents larger prevalence rates for the group of
participant households than for the non-participants.
Ultimately, existing economic theory seems to agree that gender-oriented CCTs improve the status of ben-
eﬁciary women within the power structure of their households in a series of direct and indirect ways, but no
ﬁnal conclusions have been reached on how this improved position relates to the exhibition of violent behaviors
by the hands of women's intimate partners. Accordingly, empirical research on the relationship between par-
ticipation into the Mexican program Oportunidades and intimate partner violence is still scarce, and presents
considerably mixed results. Such studies tend to be based on the analysis of qualitative information obtained
from personal interviews and focus groups, and in the cases where quantitative methods come into place, the
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application of traditional OLS methodologies to cross-sectional Mexican surveys arises as the common tool to
obtain the program's impact estimates.
Therefore, this study aims to throw some light on the issue by investigating whether or not participation into
Oportunidades is likely to signiﬁcantly alter the prevalence of psychological violence among those couples that
beneﬁt from the program. Two are the main contributions of this paper to the existing research. First, the use
of a novel indicator of psychological abuse based on the extent to which a woman actively participates in making
decisions relative to the use of contraceptive methods. Second, the econometric methodolgy utilized to perform
such an investigation: this study is pioneer in applying a combined diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach with more
traditional propensity score matching techniques to a longitudinal household survey in order to provide consistent
estimates of the program's impact on the variable of interest.
4. The Social Program Oportunidades
4.1. Program Description
In August of 1997, and under the name of Progresa4, the Mexican government established a nationwide, anti-
poverty program whose main goal was to improve human development in the country by investing in the edu-
cation, health, and nutrition of Mexican children living below the Minimum Well-Being Line (Bobonis, Castro,
and González-Brenes, 2013). Program's coverage was initially restricted to the rural poor, and by 1999, almost
2.6 million families were already beneﬁting from it. Five years after its ﬁrst implementation, the program was
renamed Oportunidades and extended geographically so as to cover semi-urban and urban areas, reaching more
than 5 million Mexican families by the year 2005 (Palermo & Braymen, 2010).
Although similar programs had been implemented before5, Oportunidades is the ﬁrst social intervention at the
national level that, given its particular design, has the potential to signiﬁcantly change women's intra-household
status in a number of diﬀerent direct and indirect ways (Adato et al., 2000).
First of all, the main component of the program consists in bi-monthly cash transfers exclusively received by
the mother of the participant family6 (Bobonis, Castro, and González-Brenes, 2013). The fact that monetary
transfers are deliberately and directly disbursed to the female heads-of-households is a unique feature of this
program, and the most clear way through which Oportunidades can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the role
played by women within their households. Following existing literature, by disbursing periodical cash transfers
to the female head-of-household, the program increases available economic resources in the hands of women,
which ultimately modiﬁes their perceived position within the power structure of the household.
4Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación.
5Pronasol (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) was pioneer and operated in the country from 1988 to 1994.
6The program also provides other in-kind health beneﬁts such as nutritional supplements for children, but these will not be
matter of study in this paper.
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Secondly, the reception of the aforementioned transfers is conditional on the discharge of a series of obligations
by the participant women. In fact, in order to maintain the beneﬁciary status, children of participant women must
be enrolled in school and periodically taken to health visits. Women must also contribute to program activities
with a certain number of work hours, and attend pláticas, or health promotion workshops, in a monthly manner
(Bobonis, Castro, and González-Brenes, 2013). As already stated in the literature, this imposition of attending
regular health seminars is another indirect mechanism though which Oportunidades can empower women within
their households. Pláticas enable mothers to regularly meet with other beneﬁciaries of the program, which
allows them to share common experiences and concerns, and improve their communication skills (Adato et al.,
2000). These practices are likely to increase women's self-esteem and conﬁdence, reinforcing this way the already
empowering eﬀect of the granted cash transfers.
Finally, the central role that women play in the design and development of Oportunidades is likely to make
them feel they are deserving of a higher status within their households (Adato et al., 2000). In Oportunidades,
the Mexican government openly puts women in the center of the intervention and recognizes their key importance
in providing a better future for their families. It is this high-level recognition that therefore motivates women
to demand a similar recognition within their households as well.
4.2. Program Implementation
Since its origins, participation into Progresa is determined by following a considerably clear two-stages process.
First, localities7 in which the program is to operate are selected based on their respective Social Marginalization
Index8 and Social Backwardness Index (SBI)9, which serve to identify those extremely poor areas for which
the need of the program implementation is more acute. After that, and based on socioeconomic information
collected through household-level questionnaires, families within the chosen communities are assigned with an
estimation of their respective income per capita. Household participation is then decided in a case by case basis
by comparing income per capita estimates with the exogenously established Minimum Well-Being Line (Bobonis,
Castro, and González-Brenes, 2013).
A key feature of this selection process is that not every household residing in a community where the
program is implemented and with an estimated income per capita below the Minimum Well-Being Line, ﬁnally
participates into the program. Instead, the incorporation of a household eventually depends on the budget
possibilities of the Mexican Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL, 2014). This budgetary restriction is
7Mexico has 31 states, each of which is subdivided into autonomous municipios or municipalities. Each municipality is in turn
subdivided into a series of localities, or smaller communities. In total, Mexico counts with 2,454 municipalities and almost 200,000
localities (INEGI, 2008).
The terms locality and community are used indistinctly in this paper.
8Or Índice de Marginación Social. This monotonically positive index is constructed by the National Population Council
(CONAPO) by aggregating information on nine diﬀerent forms of social exclusion at the state level. The higher the percentage of
the index, the higher the degree of marginalization of the geographic area of interest (CONAPO, 2011).
9Or Índice de Rezago Social. This index is constructed by aggregating information on four diﬀerent forms of social exclusion at
the state and municipality levels. The higher the index, the higher the degree of backwardness of the geographic area of interest.
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key for the identiﬁcation strategy of this paper, since for speciﬁc values of certain socioeconomic characteristics,
it is possible to distinguish both participant and non-participant households10.
It is also important to highlight that with the program expansion in 2002, a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation was
introduced in relation to the second stage of this incorporation process. Since that moment, once targeted
localities have been chosen for implementation, households interested in participating into the program are
now responsible for attending local oﬃces and start the process of application for the program themselves. The
collection of socioeconomic information and estimation of a household's income per capita is therefore exclusively
performed for those households that decide to initiate the application. This modiﬁcation in the implementation
process is considerably relevant from an impact evaluation point of view, since it introduces an element of
self-selection into the program that will be further discussed in following sections11.
5. Data and Methodology
5.1. Data Sources
To empirically investigate my theoretical predictions, I combine socioeconomic data on Mexican households with
aggregated information on the respective localities where those households reside.
All household-level data and most of the community-level data comes from the ﬁrst (2002) and second waves
(2005/2006) of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS): a multidimensional and longitudinal database that
collects information on approximately 35,000 individuals, 8,440 households, and 150 municipalities in Mexico
(MxFLS, 2014).
The decision of using this particular household survey for the present study is given by several reasons. First,
the stratiﬁed, multi-staged, and independent character of the survey sample makes it particularly suitable as
a representation of a wide range of socioeconomic, demographic, and health-related indicators of the Mexican
population at the national, regional, and rural-urban levels. Secondly, its multi-thematic character facilitates
the analysis of potential relations among diﬀerent socioeconomic phenomena of interest, such as the link between
participation in Oportunidades and the bargaining power exercised by Mexican women within their couples on
the use of contraceptive methods. Finally, the MxFLS follows Mexican individuals throughout time12, being
the only currently available Mexican survey that collects longitudinal information on particular indicators of
intimate partner abuse, such as the diminished decision power of women over their own sexual choices.
Despite these undoubtedly beneﬁcial characteristics, the MxFLS presents a signiﬁcant drawback for the eval-
uation purposes of Oportunidades: data on participation into the program at the household-level is exclusively
10See Section 5.3.
11See Section 5.3.
12The second wave (2005/2006) achieved a 90 per cent re-contacting rate at the household level.
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available for the ﬁrst wave of the survey (Palermo & Braymen, 2010; MxFLS, 2014). For the 2005/2006 round,
however, the only existing information about participation in Oportunidades comes at the community level.
Thus, information on households' potential exposure to the program is available for both 2002 and 2005, but
data on their actual participation status is not. This particularity has a determinant eﬀect in the choice of
econometric methodologies used in the following empirical analyses, which I describe below in more detail13.
Locality-level information is completed by incorporating data on each community's SBI14, which has been ob-
tained from the data repository of the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL,
2014).
5.2. Data Description
To construct a measure of the prevalence of psychological intimate-partner violence within a household, I use
individuals' answers in the MxFLS to the following question: generally speaking, in this household, who takes
the decisions regarding if you or your spouse/couple use contraceptives (for not having children)? , to which
possible responses are respondent, spouse, children, mother, father, mother in law, father in law,
brother, sister, brother in law, sister in law, grandparents, and do not know.
With the information obtained from individual responses to that question, I construct a dependent indicator
variable at the household-level, power, that equals one if the woman of the household is mentioned to somehow
taking part in the household's decision process over the use of contraceptives (either by herself, jointly with
her couple, or jointly with another household member), and zero otherwise. Observations of single-headed
households, households without children15, and households in which survey respondents answered do not know
are dropped.
With respect to the covariates of interest, Table 1 provides names, deﬁnitions, and descriptions of all the
variables that will be part of the following analyses.
5.3. Identiﬁcation Strategies
This study builds on household and community-level data from the ﬁrst and second waves of the MxFLS. Given
the longitudinal character of the survey, the most desirable impact evaluation of Oportunidades on the prevalence
of intimate emotional abuse would consist in the comparison of the dependent indicator variable power between
participant and non-participant households in 2002 and 2005, respectively. This would lead to the obtainment
of the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT), that is, the average eﬀect of participating into Oportu-
13See Section 5.3.
14According to Benita & Gómez (2013), the SBI incorporates the same information than its preceeding Índice de Marginación
Social, but it is constructed at a more dissagregated level. This makes it more accurate for analysis purposes, since it does not
assume within-state homogeneity.
15According to the Operating Rules of the Human Development Program Oportunidades (SEDESOL, 2014), having children
under the age of eighteen is a fundamental pre-requisite for a household to become beneﬁciary of the program.
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Table 1: Names and Deﬁnitions of Covariates of Interest
Var. Name Var. Deﬁnition Var. Description
log_members Logarithm of the total number of 
household members.
dependency Demographic Independence Index. Ratio between the total number of household
members aged under 15 or over 64, and the total
number of household members aged between
15-64.
schooling [1] Average schooling of household Average number of years of complete schooling
head and spouse. attained by the household head and his/her
spouse [2].
remittances Reception of remittances by the Dummy variable that takes value one if the household
household. receives remittances from family or friends living
abroad, and zero otherwise.
property [1] Dwelling's ownership status. Dummy variable that takes value one if the dwelling
where the household members inhabit is owned by
any of them.
rooms [1] Total number of rooms within the 
dwelling.
telephone Telephone ownserhip. Dummy variable that takes value one if the dwelling
has a telephone, and zero otherwise.
electric Electric appliances ownership. Dummy variable that takes value one if the dwelling
has electric appliances, and zero otherwise.
electronic Electronic appliances ownership. Dummy variable that takes value one if the dwelling
has electronic appliances, and zero otherwise.
ﬂoor Physical condition of the dwelling's Dummy variable that takes value one if the
ﬂoor. dwelling's ﬂooring type is ﬁrm cement, and zero
otherwise.
water [1] Independent access to water for Dummy variable that takes value one if the main
bathing and washing. source of water for bathing and washing is within the
dwelling, and zero otherwise.
car Car ownership. Dummy variable that takes value one if the household
owns a car, and zero otherwise.
fuel Use of fuel for cooking. Dummy variable that takes value one if the household
uses fuel to cook, and zero otherwise.
rural [1] Rural character of the locality Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the
where the household resides. community has a population of more than 100,000;
2 if between 15,000 and 100,000; 3 if between 2,500
and 15,000; and 4 if less than 2,500.
marginality [1] Community's index of Continuous variable that informs about the degree of
social backwardness. social backwardness of the locality where the
household resides. It ranges from -3 to 3.
[1] These variables are the only ones that enter the analysis for ATT estimation purposes.
[2] Variable constructed based on the responses to the question: which is/was the last level of schooling you attended?,
to which possible responses are without instruction, preschool or kinder, elementary, secondary, open secondary,
high school, open high school, normal basic, college, graduate, and do not know.
The number of complete schooling years attained by both the household head and his/her spouse is calculated following
the equivalency established by the Dirección General de Relaciones Internacionales de México (Mexterior, 2014):
Without instruction: 0 years
Completed preschool or kinder: 3 years
Completed elementary: 9 years
Completed secondary or open secondary: 12 years
Completed high school or open high school: 15 years
Completed college: 20 years
Completed graduate: 22 years.
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nidades on the probability of experiencing psychological violence for those women that actually beneﬁted from
the program during that period of time (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013).
Nonetheless, the obtainment of that parameter is particularly controversial given the data at hand because as
already mentioned, information on actual participation into the program at the household-level is only available
for the year 2002. Furthermore, by making interested households responsible for starting the application process
for the program themselves16, the expansion phase of Oportunidades introduced an important element of self-
selection into participation that cannot be overlooked by this evaluation. In fact, take up rates during the ﬁrst
years after the change in the program's implementation process were considerably low, and numerous eligible
households did actually not register for participation.
To overcome such downsides, this paper opts for an alternative strategy. First, the program's Average
Intention-to-Treat Eﬀect (AIT) is estimated by applying a Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching method-
ology (Abadie, 2005; Heckman et al., 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Smith & Todd, 2005), which
provides a ﬁrst approximation of the potential magnitude of the ATT. Secondly, such a result is further spec-
iﬁed by applying a standard matching methodology to the 2002 survey data, which allows to obtain a closer
estimation of the program's ATT.
5.3.1. Oportunidades' Average Intention-to-Treat Eﬀect (AIT)
Unlike the ATT, estimation of the AIT ignores the issue of actual household participation into Oportunidades
and focuses on households' eligibility to participate into the program. Thus, households are considered eligible
for participation if they reside in a locality that oﬀers the possibility of joining Oportunidades, and the AIT
measures the diﬀerences in the outcome of interest between eligible and non-eligible households.
Besides tackling problems related to the lack of data on actual household participation in the second survey
round and the potential presence of an element of self-selection into the program between 2002 and 2005,
focusing on obtaining AIT estimates brings about additional beneﬁts to this particular study. First, AIT
estimates represent the average eﬀect of Oportunidades on the experience of intimate psychological abuse by all
women that are oﬀered the possibility of joining the program regardless of whether they ultimately participate,
which has a highly signiﬁcant interest from a policy point of view (Angelucci & Attanasio, 2006; Glennerster &
Takavarasha, 2013). Second, and as long as Oportunidades could be proven to not have any spillover eﬀects on
non-treated households in participating localities, the AIT parameter would also consistently represent a lower
bound to the ATT (Angelucci & Attanasio, 2006; Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
For the estimation of the AIT, this paper uses a two-steps Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching
methodology exclusively performed for those households that were not exposed to Oportunidades in 200217.
16See Section IV.2.
17Those households that resided in localities in which the program had not been implemented yet.
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The choice of this particular methodology is essentially motivated by the fact that the allocation of Oportu-
nidades across Mexican localities over time has not been random. The program was indeed ﬁrst implemented
in rural localities that presented particularly large marginality indexes, and was progressively extended to less
marginalized communities and semi-urban and urban areas. Consequently, this non-random, phase-in imple-
mentation process (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013, p.128) implies that initially treated households are likely
to systematically diﬀer from control ones in a set of variables that may be simultaneously correlated with both
the probability of being exposed to Oportunidades and the experience of intimate emotional abuse by the woman
of the household.
Thus, to prevent the estimated impact of oﬀering Oportunidades from being a function of certain community-
level characteristics, the incorporation of a diﬀerence-in diﬀerences (DiD) estimation technique arises as a
particularly suitable option. By focusing on the change in the variable of interest (rather than on its level)
in treatment and control groups, DiD estimation allows to control for observed, and time-ﬁxed, unobserved
characteristics at the community level that can potentially aﬀect treatment status and the outcome variable of
interest at the same time (Angelucci & Attanasio, 2006).
However, this simple DiD methodology, as other traditional regression methods, uses parametric speciﬁcations
to account for diﬀerences in observables between treatment and control units. In particular, it requires that, had
the treatment not taken place, the average outcome of interest in the treatment group would have been the same
than the one observed in the control group (Abadie, 2005)18. But, if pre-treatment characteristics signiﬁcantly
diﬀer across treatment status and are associated to the outcome variable of interest, this identifying assumption
would be unlikely to hold.
To properly account for this potential heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects, this paper relies on a two-steps
methodology in which matching techniques are incorporated to the DiD approach. First, treated and untreated
households are matched in a series of observable characteristics that makes them comparable to each other19.
After that, a DiD regression is performed for the matched pairs in order to obtain the AIT estimates.
In sum, the proposed conditional DiD matching methodology relaxes the traditional parallel trend assumption
and becomes a nonparametric extension to the simple DiD approach in which treated and non-treated households
with diﬀering observed characteristics are allowed to experience diﬀerent time trends in the outcome variable of
interest. This methodology is particularly beneﬁcial for the estimation of treatment eﬀects in non-randomized
experiments, since it combines the advantage of controlling for time-invariant non-observable features while it
relaxes the linear assumption when controlling for observed characteristics (Abadie, 2005). The superiority of this
method in comparison to other non-experimental matching estimators has been empirically proved (Heckman,
18Parallel trend assumption.
19See Appendix A.1.
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Ichimura, & Todd, 1998; Smith & Todd, 2005).
My empirical analysis starts then by running a probit regression of the probability of a household to be
exposed to Oportunidades between 2002 and 2005 on a series of socioeconomic independent variables measured
in 2002 in the following form:
Prob (exposure = 1|Xi) = Φ(α+X ′iβ)
where X
′
i is a vector of locality and household-level variables that are signiﬁcantly correlated not only with each
household's eligibility to participate into Oportunidades, but with the way contraceptive decisions are made
within the household as well.
Note here that X
′
i incorporates independent regressors at both the community and the household levels.
In theory, the probability of a household of residing in a treatment locality is a function of certain observable
variables at the locality level, information that is summarized by each community's SBI. Thus, ideally, predicted
probabilities of exposure to the program should exclusively be dependent on such an index of social backwardness.
However, conditioning solely on each locality's SBI perfectly discriminates between treatment and control areas,
which makes the common support20 between treated and untreated households empty. This is the reason why
certain household-level variables that can also aﬀect each households' eligibility to participate into Oportunidades
are incorporated into the probit regression, as proposed by Angelucci & Attanasio (2006).
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that every independent variable that enters the probit regression
has been measured in 2002, that is, the baseline year. This assures the consistency of the matching procedure,
since the variables on which matching is performed are measured before treatment took place, and therefore,
were not aﬀected by treatment status (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
Once predicted probabilities of household eligibility have been obtained, they are used to match treated and
untreated households and establish an area of common support. I then test that the balancing property holds
in all blocks for all independent regressors. Finally, a DiD regression is run for those observations within the
common support area in order to obtain the AIT estimates21.
5.3.2. Oportunidades' Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT): an Approximation
Despite being interesting from a policy point of view, the estimation of the AIT is not generally the main objective
when aiming to evaluate the potential eﬀects of the implementation of a social program such as Oportunidades.
The main parameter of interest is indeed the ATT, or the average eﬀect of the program on the outcome variable
for those individuals that become actual beneﬁciaries of the treatment.
20According to Angelucci and Attanasio (2006), it is the region for which propensity scores present positive densities for both
treatment and comparison units.
21See Appendix A.2 for further details on the matching logarithm and the DiD estimation procedure.
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Given that data on actual participation in Oportunidades is only available for the ﬁrst wave of the MxFLS,
the estimation of the ATT can only be performed on the survey sample of 2002. Moreover, and due to the
fact that participation into Oportunidades is not random, but depends on a series of locality and household-
level characteristics, a standard propensity score matching methodology will be used for the estimation of this
parameter22.
As in the previous section, and being the selection on observables the main identifying assumption of the
matching methodology, I start by running a probit regression of the probability of a household of receiving
Oportunidades in 2002 on a series of independent variables. Several diﬀerences with respect to the estimation
process of the AIT should be noted here.
First of all, the dependent variable of the probit regression is now a dichotomous variable that takes value
1 if the household participates into Oportunidades in 2002, and zero otherwise. Thus, for the estimation of the
ATT, it is actual participation into the program (and no mere eligibility) that determines a household's treatment
status. In the second place, baseline pre-program information on households' socioeconomic characteristics of
interest is not available in this case. Both treatment status and independent covariates are measured at the same
point in time, which could bring about important risks for the consistency of the matching process (Behrman et
al., 2008; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). Thus, only 2002 variables that are not likely to have been altered
by participation into Oportunidades enter the probit regression this time23.
Once predicted probabilities of actual participation in the program have been obtained, I use them to match
treated and untreated households and establish an area of common support. I then test that the balancing
property holds in all blocks for all independent regressors, and obtain the ATT estimates.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Average Intention-to-Treat Eﬀect (AIT)
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics on all conditioning variables that will be used to estimate the
probability of each household in the sample of being eligible to participate in Oportunidades between 2002 and
2005. Statistics are provided for both treatment and control groups, and the statistical signiﬁcance of existing
diﬀerences between both groups is indicated when appropriate.
Obtained results demonstrate that at the baseline year, and before any matching procedure is performed,
households that are to be exposed to Oportunidades during the period of interest clearly present a lower socioe-
conomic status than those that belong to communities in which the program will not be implemented. First,
eligible households belong to communities with larger indexes of backwardness. Moreover, they are larger in
22See Appendix A.2 for further details on the matching logarithm.
23See Table 1 for identiﬁcation of these variables.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Propensity Score Conditioning Variables; AIT Estimation
A. Pre-Matching B. Post-Matching
Treated Control Diﬀerence Treated Control Diﬀerence
log_members 1.454 1.401 0.053** 1.449 1.457 0.008
dependency 0.799 0.725 0.074** 0.788 0.796 0.009
schooling 8.048 7.978 0.070 8.078 8.065 -0.013
remittances 0.090 0.043 0.047** 0.070 0.088 0.018
property 0.779 0.759 0.021 0.776 0.780 0.004
rooms 2.150 2.093 0.057 2.165 2.164 -0.002
telephone 0.475 0.506 -0.031 0.476 0.482 0.006
electric 0.948 0.975 -0.027** 0.959 0.955 -0.004
electronic 0.968 0.975 -0.007 0.969 0.971 0.002
ﬂoor 0.452 0.469 -0.017 0.440 0.454 0.014
water 0.835 0.843 -0.007 0.852 0.840 -0.012
car 0.485 0.442 0.043* 0.494 0.494 0
fuel 1.000 1.000 (dropped) 1.000 1.000 (dropped)
rural 2.283 2.408 -0.125* 2.295 2.266 -0.028
SBI -1.127 -1.217 0.091** -1.143 -1.138 -0.005
N 1333 395 1333 395
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
The study sample is restricted to 1,728 households. These households: i) are conformed by couples that have at least
one child, ii) provided information when asked about the decision-making process on the use of contraceptive methods,
iii) were interviewed both in 2002 and 2005, iv) were not exposed to Oportunidades by 2002, and v) their estimated
propensity score lies within the common support area.
Treated group is composed by those households that reside in communities in which Oportunidades is implemented at
some point between 2002 and 2005. Control group is composed by those households that reside in communities in which
Oportunidades is yet not implemented by 2005.
A Kernel algorithm has been used to obtain the results in panel B.
All sample means are weighted by the inverse of sampling weights.
terms of number of family members, present higher dependency ratios, tend to receive more ﬁnancial help from
family and friends living abroad, and are less likely to own electric appliances. Finally, and given the urban-
focus that has been characterizing the expansion process of Oportunidades since 2002, the proportion of urban
households that conform the treatment group is signiﬁcantly larger in comparison to the control one. This
phenomenon can probably explain why treated households appear to be more likely to have their own car.
The existence of meaningful diﬀerences in various determinants of the probability of being eligible to partici-
pate into Oportunidades justiﬁes why it would not be appropriate to use the outcome of interest of non-exposed
households as counterfactual when aiming to estimate the AIT of the program. Independent covariates are
potentially correlated with the dependent indicator power, and thus, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the values of those
regressors make impossible to compare the potential outcomes of violence as untreated of exposed and non-
exposed groups. This phenomenon generates the need of matching treated and untreated households before
aiming to estimate the AIT of Oportunidades on the outcome variable of interest.
Consequently, I ﬁrst enter the aforementioned variables into a probit model and use the estimated coeﬃcients
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to predict the propensity scores of eligibility of all households in both the treatment and comparison groups.
Panels A and B of Figure 3 illustrate the density distribution of the predicted probabilities by treatment status,
concluding the existence of a common support area between [0.67, 0.99]24.
Predicted probabilities are then used to match treated and untreated households within the common support
by applying a Kernel algorithm. Once the matching procedure has ﬁnalized, the fulﬁllment of the balancing
property is veriﬁed25, and panel B of Table 2 presents the results. As it can be seen, previous diﬀerences in
the means of those observable variables on which matching has been performed are not statistically signiﬁcant
at 5% level anymore, and it is possible to conclude that the values of those independent regressors on which
matched pairs have been constructed are statistically the same across treated and non-treated households. This
process generates a consistent counterfactual group, which will facilitate the interpretation of AIT estimates
as the average impact of being exposed to Oportunidades on the prevalence of psychological abusive behaviors
among Mexican couples.
Finally, a Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching estimation26 is performed, and estimates of the
AIT are presented in Table 3. In particular, the dependent indicator power has been constructed based on the
survey responses given by women in Panel A, and by men in Panel B.
Results on Panel A demonstrate that in 2002, the fraction of households in which women have some kind
of participation in making the decision on the use of contraceptives is slightly larger for the treatment (70.5%)
than for the control group (68.3%). Nevertheless, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. In 2005,
however, women's participation rates in the decision process decrease in both treatment and control groups. In
the ﬁrst case, only 64.1% of women report having participating in the decision on the use of contraceptives, while
this percentage decreases up to 51.6% for the latter group of households. From this result, it can be stated that
in general terms, Mexican women experience larger levels of psychological violence from their intimate partners
in 2005 than in 2002.
Such a generalized increase in the prevalence of emotional abuse could ﬁnd diﬀerent theoretical explanations
and should be subject to further research, but that is not the main concern of this study. What is important to
notice here, however, is that the increase in psychological violence rates over time is not identical for both types of
households. The obtained diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate in the last column of Table 2 demonstrates that being
exposed to the program Oportunidades has an statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the outcome variable of interest.
The probability of actively participating in the decision on the use of contraceptives is 10.4 percentage points
larger for women in households that are exposed to Oportunidades between 2002 and 2005, in comparison to
those in households that belong to communities in which the program is not implemented. Thus, AIT estimates
demonstrate that being exposed to Oportunidades signiﬁcantly reduces the prevalence of psychological violence
24Stata's pscore command conﬁrms this result.
25Stata's psmatch2 and pstest commands have been used for this purpose.
26Stata's diﬀ command is used for this purpose.
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Figure 3: Validation of Common Support; AIT Estimation
A. Separate Propensity Score Histograms for Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Control
B. Propensity Score Histogram by Treatment Status
Table 3: AIT Estimation: Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching Methodology
2002 2005
Control Treated Diﬀerence Control Treated Diﬀerence DiD
A. Female ˆpower 0.683 0.705 0.022 0.516 0.641 0.126* 0.104+
respondents se (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.056) (0.015) (0.058) (0.062)
B. Male ˆpower 0.682 0.685 0.003 0.546 0.653 0.107+ 0.104+
respondents se (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.056) (0.015) (0.058) (0.062)
N 395 1333 395 1333
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
A Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching methodology has been used to obtain the results in the last column.
among Mexican couples. This result is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Almost identical results are found in Panel B of Table 3, which suggests than both Mexican men and women
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have very similar perceptions about which members of the household have a say regarding the decision-making
process on the use of contraceptive measures.
6.1.1. Robustness Check
I extend the matching analysis by restricting possible matches to other households that share the same rural-
urban classiﬁcation. In this way, rural households living in communities with less than 2,500 people are exclu-
sively matched to other households also living in this type of municipality. The same procedure is applied for the
other three categories of such a classiﬁcation27. This approach allows to further control for those potential unac-
counted, unobserved diﬀerences between urban and rural households that are likely to inﬂuence the prevalence
of psychological violence within the couple. AIT estimates are presented in Table 428.
Results in the last column of Table 4 show that, after restricting possible matches to other households with the
same rural-urban classiﬁcation, the statistical signiﬁcance of Oportunidades' AIT estimates vanishes, suggesting
that previously obtained results on the program's impact on intimate partner violence had been overestimated.
This overestimation is most likely due to the fact that the matching procedure did not completely account
for the diﬀerences associated to the rural-urban character of treatment and untreated households. Considering
that the rural character of a household negatively aﬀects both the probability of being eligible to participate
into Oportunidades between 2002 and 200529 and the participation share of women on intra-household decisions
on contraceptive use30, the existence of unaccounted diﬀerences in such an independent covariate are likely to
have led to the obtainment of upward biased estimates of Oportunidades' AIT eﬀects on the outcome variable
of interest. Results in Table 5 conﬁrm these predictions.
On the one hand, Panel A of Table 5 corroborates the previously elucidated existence of a positive, signiﬁcant
relationship between exposure to Oportunidades and women's participation in the decision-making over contra-
ceptive use for the case of urban households. Restricted to the urban context, women in households exposed to
Oportunidades between 2002 and 2005 present a probability of actively participating in the decision on the use
of contraceptives that is 13.5 percentage points larger than that of women in non-eligible households (p<0.10).
Furthermore, when it is men's responses the ones taken into account for the construction of the dependent vari-
able, the magnitude of the estimated impact increases up to 16 percentage points and becomes signiﬁcant at 5%
level. Ultimately, it is possible to aﬃrm that in the urban context, being exposed to Oportunidades signiﬁcantly
reduces the prevalence of psychological violence among Mexican couples.
On the other hand, highly diﬀerent results are found for the case of rural households. First, no signiﬁcant
association between eligibility into the program and intimate partner violence is found when it is women who
27See Table 1 for further details on the rural-urban classiﬁcation.
28Results on the validation of the common support and balancing properties are available upon request.
29As it has been explained, the expansion process of Oportunidades that took place since 2002 was particularly focused on reaching
urban and semi-urban areas.
30Conservative beliefs regarding established gender roles within the couple tend to prevail in rural localities.
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Table 4: AIT Estimation: Robustness Check
2002 2005
Control Treated Diﬀerence Control Treated Diﬀerence DiD
A. Female ˆpower 0.656 0.662 0.006 0.567 0.6 0.033 0.028
respondents se (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.035) (0.009) (0.036) (0.040)
B. Male ˆpower 0.650 0.651 0.001 0.588 0.609 0.021 0.020
respondents se (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.035) (0.009) (0.036) (0.040)
N 413 2974 413 1504
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
A Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching methodology has been used to obtain the results in the last column.
Table 5: AIT Estimation: Heterogeneous Eﬀects
A. Urban Households
2002 2005
Control Treated Diﬀerence Control Treated Diﬀerence DiD
A.1. Female ˆpower 0.680 0.695 0.015 0.501 0.652 0.150* 0.135+
respondents se (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.061) (0.021) (0.065) (0.071)
A.2. Male ˆpower 0.688 0.698 0.009 0.510 0.680 0.170** 0.160*
respondents se (0.02) (0.020) (0.028) (0.061) (0.02) (0.064) (0.070)
N 221 780 221 780
B. Rural Households
2002 2005
Control Treated Diﬀerence Control Treated Diﬀerence DiD
A. Female ˆpower 0.690 0.704 0.014 0.738 0.622 -0.116 -0.130
respondents se (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.168) (0.019) (0.169) (0.171)
B. Male ˆpower 0.703 0.664 -0.039 0.772 0.622 -0.378* -0.150*
respondents se (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.169) (0.019) (0.170) (0.172)
N 192 724 192 724
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
A Conditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Matching methodology has been used to obtain the results in the last column.
Following the classiﬁcation in Table 1, urban households are those residing in localities that take values 1 (population of
more than 100,000) and 2 (population between 15,000 and 100,000) for the categorical variable rural . Accordingly, rural
households are those residing in communities that take values 3 (population between 2,500 and 15,000) and 4 (population
less than 2,500) for such a variable.
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inform about their own participation in making decisions on the use of contraceptive methods. Moreover, when
men's responses are considered, exposure to Oportunidades appears to be negatively correlated with women's
decision power on contraceptive use. Indeed, women in rural households exposed to Oportunidades between
2002 and 2005 appear to have a probability of participation in the decision on the use of contraceptives that is
15 percentage points lower than that of rural women in non-eligible households (p<0.05).
The diﬀering results obtained from women's and men's responses seem to indicate that women in rural
households can be suspected of under-reporting any changes occurred in their participation power on decisions
about the use of contraceptives. This could be explained by the fact that, in the rural setting, cultural beliefs
on established gender roles within the couple tend to be more rooted than in urban areas. This could generate
feelings of shame or fear of retaliation among rural women, which could explain why no signiﬁcant program
impact is found when using female responses in the construction of the dependent variable. Moreover, when
using men's responses, AIT estimates for Mexican rural households seem to be more compatible with extractive
theories on domestic violence, in which the increased power position attained by women through their eligibility
to participate into Oportunidades supposes a threat for their intimate partners, which translates into a larger
prevalence of violent behaviors within the household.
These divergent results demonstrate the existence of certain underlying characteristics typical of the Mexican
rural setting that make it unique, and conﬁrm the importance of strictly controlling for this covariate when
assessing the impact of Oportunidades on intimate partner violence outcomes.
6.2. Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATT)
As in the previous section, Panel A of Table 6 presents summary statistics of those independent variables that
will be used to estimate the probability of each household in the sample to actually participate in the program
Oportunidades in 2002. Results demonstrate that before matching, beneﬁciary households tend to be situated
in communities where backwardness indexes are larger. They are also characterized by lower levels of schooling
attainment achieved by household heads and spouses, lower number of rooms per dwelling, and the prevalence
of outside water sources for washing and bathing. In this case, the proportion of urban households within the
treatment group is signiﬁcantly lower than that of the control group, which can probably explain why treated
households appear to be more likely to own their living arrangements rather than to rent them.
Again, the existence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the determinants of the probability of partic-
ipation in Oportunidades justiﬁes the need of performing a matching procedure previous to any estimation of
the ATT. As before, I ﬁrst predict the propensity scores of participating in the program of all households in the
sample by using a probit model. Panels A and B of Figure 4 illustrate the density distribution of the predicted
probabilities by treatment status, and conﬁrm the existence of a common support area between [0.05, 0.6].
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Table 6: Summary Statistics on Propensity Score Conditioning Variables; ATT Estimation
A. Pre-Matching B. Post-Matching
Treat Cont Diﬀ Treat Cont Diﬀ
schooling 4.989 7.513 -2.524** 5.714 5.905 -0.191
property 0.849 0.763 0.086** 0.816 0.823 -0.007
rooms 1.892 2.101 -0.209** 1.959 1.950 0.009
water 0.535 0.879 -0.344** 0.536 0.493 0.043
rural 3.820 2.312 1.508** 3.685 3.619 0.066
marginality -0.208 -1.201 0.994** -0.434 -0.464 0.030
N 267 2,439 267 2,439
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
The study sample is restricted to 2,706 households. These households: i) are conformed by couples that have at least one
children, ii) provided information when asked about the decision-making process on the use of contraceptive methods,
and iii) their estimated propensity score lies within the common support area.
Treated group is composed by those households that are actual beneﬁciaries of Oportunidades by 2002. Control group is
composed by those households that do not participate into the program by 2002.
A Kernel algorithm has been used to obtain the results in panel B.
All sample means are weighted by the inverse of sampling weights.
Figure 4: Validation of Common Support; ATT Estimation
A. Separate Propensity Score Histograms for Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Control
B. Propensity Score Histogram by Treatment Status
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For comparison purposes with the AIT estimation, predicted probabilities are used to match treated and
untreated households within the common support area by applying a Kernel algorithm, and the balancing
property is later veriﬁed. Panel B of Table 6 introduces the results. Previously existing diﬀerences in the
means of those observable variables on which matching has been performed are not statistically signiﬁcant at
5% level anymore. Observable characteristics on which matched pairs have been constructed are then balanced
across treated and non-treated households, which will allow to interpret ATT estimates as the average impact
of participating into Oportunidades on the prevalence of psychological violence among those Mexican couples
that were beneﬁciaries of the program by 2002.
Estimates of the ATT are presented in Table 7. Given the extreme importance of meticulously controlling
for the rural-urban character of the study households demonstrated in the previous section, results on the ﬁrst
column of Table 7 have already been obtained by restricting possible matches to other households that share
the same rural-urban classiﬁcation.
ATT estimates show that participation into the program Oportunidades has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the prevalence of intimate partner violence among beneﬁciary couples. In fact, the probability of actively
participating in the decision on the use of contraceptives is 13.2 percentage points larger for beneﬁciary mothers
than for non-participants (p<0.05), a result that increases up to 13.8 percentage points when men's responses
are the ones evaluated. In conclusion, estimation of the ATT corroborates previous AIT eﬀect predictions:
participation into Oportunidades signiﬁcantly reduces the prevalence of psychological violence among Mexican
couples, and this result is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
The last two columns in Table 7 present considerably similar results to the ones obtained in Table 5 as
well. First, while the positive relationship between participation into Oportunidades and intimate psychological
violence remains signiﬁcant for the case of urban households, such an eﬀect vanishes when analyzing the rural
setting. Moreover, the estimated impact of the program is in any case larger when men's survey responses are
used for the construction of the dependent variable, instead of those of women.
6.3. Limitations
The main goal of this investigation was to throw some light on the potentially existent relationship between
participation into the Mexican program Oportunidades and the prevalence of intimate partner violence among
Mexican couples. No association was found for the case of rural households, but ﬁndings are encouraging within
the urban setting. However, this study suﬀers from signiﬁcant methodological caveats that cannot be overlooked,
and that should be carefully considered in further research on the topic.
On the one hand, this study builds on household and community-level data from the ﬁrst and second waves
of the MxFLS. Despite counting with certain features that make it appropriate for the proposed analysis, the
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Table 7: ATT Estimation: Kernel Propensity Score Methodology
All Urban Rural
A. Female ˆpower 0.132* 0.083* 0.076
respondents se (0.065) (0.039) (0.111)
B. Male ˆpower 0.138* 0.092** 0.118
respondents se (0.047) (0.040) (0.114)
N 2,706 1,610 1,096
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
A Kernel Propensity Score methodology has been used to obtain the results in all three columns.
Following the classiﬁcation in Table 1, urban households are those residing in localities that take values 1 (population of
more than 100,000) and 2 (population between 15,000 and 100,000) for the categorical variable rural . Accordingly, rural
households are those residing in communities that take values 3 (population between 2,500 and 15,000) and 4 (population
less than 2,500) for such a variable.
second wave of this survey does not provide information about participation into Oportunidades at the household-
level. Such a drawback makes it impossible to apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology in order to obtain the
program's ATT, which would provide highly consistent estimates of the eﬀect of Oportunidades on the outcome
of interest for the beneﬁciaries of the program.
To overcome such a drawback, this paper opted for an alternative strategy. First, the program's AIT was
estimated, which provided a ﬁrst approximation of the potential magnitude of the ATT. Such a result was further
speciﬁed by applying a standard matching methodology to the 2002 survey data, which allowed to obtain a closer
estimation of the program's ATT. Given the lack of baseline information, the matching procedure was exclusively
performed on carefully selected variables that are considered to not be likely to be altered by participation into the
program. Nonetheless, I am aware of the potential biases that can be generated by this estimation methodology,
and I therefore encourage to combine the matching procedure with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach as soon
as information regarding households' participation status for the year 2005 is made publicly available.
On the other hand, robustness analyses demonstrated the presence of a signiﬁcant rural-urban heterogeneity
regarding the impact of Oportunidades on the prevalence of intimate partner violence. Prospective research on
the topic should be aware of this issue, and contemplate the possibility of restricting the analysis to either the
urban or the rural settings.
Finally, all empirical analyses in this paper use a considerably speciﬁc measure of intimate psychological
abuse that aims to reduce the chances of obtaining downward biased estimates of the impact of the program.
Despite the obvious beneﬁts of such a choice, it is important to remember that this indicator is still a self-reported
measure of the incidence of violence, and as such, it is not completely free of reporting biases.
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7. Conclusions
Although large is the literature that demonstrates the numerous positive eﬀects that the program Oportunidades
has had on the lives of Mexican families over the years, especially in the ﬁelds of children's education, health, and
nutrition, much more scarce are the studies that focus on evaluating the potential impact of the program on the
prevalence of intimate partner violence. Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the debate by speciﬁcally
investigating whether or not, participation into Oportunidades is likely to signiﬁcantly alter the prevalence of
psychological violence among those couples that beneﬁt from the program.
Two are the main contributions of this study to current research on the topic. First, it proposes the use of a
novel indicator of intimate psychological violence that has not been used before: the extent to which a woman
actively participates in making decisions relative to the use of contraceptive methods. This indicator is likely
to be less vulnerable to reporting biases than other self-reported measures of intimate partner abuse commonly
used by the literature, which considerably reduces the chances of obtaining downward biased estimates of the
program's impact on the prevalence of this type of violence. Secondly, this study is ﬁrst in taking advantage of
the panel structure of the Mexican Family Life Survey to respond to the research question of interest. Indeed, the
main empirical analysis combines a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach with traditional propensity score matching
techniques, which provides an element of additional consistency to the obtained impact estimates that has not
been achievable before.
My empirical investigation began by summarizing the main trends in the current debate on the relationship
between participation into gender-oriented conditional cash transfer programs and the prevalence of intimate
partner violence. This theoretical discussion reﬂected that, although current economic research seems to agree
that these types of programs tend to improve women's status within the power structure of their households, no
ﬁnal conclusions have been reached on how this improved position relates to the exhibition of violent behaviors
from their couples.
The estimation of Oportunidades' Average-Intention-to-Treat eﬀect brings these theoretical predictions to
the particular data, and provides empirical evidence in favor of traditional theories of the family. Results show
that the decision-making power on the use of contraceptives of women residing in households that are eligible
to participate into the program is signiﬁcantly larger than that of women in non-eligible households. Once
these results are disaggregated so as to account for the potential impact heterogeneity related to the rural-urban
character of the households in the sample, such a positive relationship appears to only concern couples residing
in urban areas. On the contrary, eligibility into Oportunidades in rural areas does not signiﬁcantly increase, but
could even reduce, women's decision power on the matter.
Estimates of the program's Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated appear to conﬁrm these initial results.
Women in urban households that actually participate into the program have a lower probability of suﬀering from
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psychological abuses from their couples, while no signiﬁcant association between the two phenomena is found in
the case of beneﬁciary women in the rural setting.
Although I am aware that the methodology used for my empirical analyses is not completely exempt of
incorporating estimation biases, the ﬁndings of this study can be interpreted as indicative that Oportunidades
has a signiﬁcant impact in reducing the level of psychological abuse suﬀered by Mexican women living in urban
areas by hands of their intimate partners.
Ultimately, this study contributes to the economic literature by providing quantitative evidence of the impact
of a speciﬁc gender-oriented CCT program on a highly particular outcome of intimate partner violence such as
it is emotional abuse. Despite the impossibility of determining to what extend these ﬁndings are speciﬁc to the
Mexican context as opposed to other gender-oriented CCTs, these results should encourage policy makers in
urban areas to further investigate the topic. Gender-oriented CCTs can have signiﬁcant eﬀects in the prevalence
of emotional abuse among couples, and they should be considered as potential complements to the issuance of
legal instruments in the ﬁght against psychological intimate partner violence in the upcoming years.
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Appendix
A.1. Potential Outcomes Framework and Matching Methodology
AIT estimates aim to inform about the impact of Oportunidades on emotional abuse prevalence among Mexican
couples that are eligible to participate into the program. To depict the estimation of such an eﬀect in an
analytical manner, the potential outcomes framework appears to be an extremely helpful tool.
Taking the following notation as standpoint:
exposureit is a dummy variable that takes value one if the locality of residence of household i at time t has been
treated with the implementation of Oportunidades, and zero otherwise;
i = 1...N ;
t can either be 2002 or 2005. At t = 2002, no locality in the sample had been exposed to the implementation of
Oportunidades yet.
Potential outcomes of interest are denoted on the basis of program eligibility in the following manner:
power1it denotes potential outcomes of emotional abuse of household i as eligible to participate into Oportu-
nidades, regardless of whether or not the household is actually eligible to participate.
power0it denotes potential violence outcomes of household i as non-eligible to participate into Oportunidades,
regardless of whether or not the household is actually eligible to participate.
Accordingly:
AIT = E[Δit] = E[power1it|exposureit = 1]− E[power0it|exposureit = 1].
Obviously, the problem arises due to the impossibility of observing the second term of the last expression.
Once a household is eligible to participate into Oportunidades, it is technically impossible to observe what the
outcome variable would have been, had the household not been exposed to the program.
Thus, matching methodologies rely on what is known as selection on observables or Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption (CIA) in order to use observed outcomes of non-exposed households as an estimation of
the unobserved counterfactual of interest. The CIA assures that, conditional on a set of observable variables,
households' exposure to the program across treatment and control localities is as good as random, and potential
outcomes therefore, independent of treatment status (Angelucci & Attanasio, 2006; Angrist & Pischke; 2008).
Analytically:
power1it, power0it ⊥ exposureit|Xi
Thus, E(power0it|Xi; exposureit = 1) = E(power0it|Xi; exposureit = 0) and consequently:
AIT = E[Δit] = E[power1it|exposureit = 1]− E[power0it|exposureit = 0].
This solves the missing counterfactual problem and allows to compute the AIT by comparing observed
outcomes of exposed and non-exposed households.
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A.2. Propensity Score Matching
As it has been shown, the essence of any matching methodology is the creation of a control group as similar as
possible to the treated one (in terms of a particular set of observed characteristics), with the ultimate goal of
reducing potential biases in the estimation of the treatment eﬀects of a particular program.
Although there exist a wide range of matching procedures, this paper builds on Rosenbaum and Rubin's
propensity score matching methodology (1983). The essence of such a method lies on the fact that matching
individuals (or households, in this case) on an n-dimensional vector of observable features is generally unfeasible
for large n31. Accordingly, what this methodology proposes instead is to summarize each unit's baseline char-
acteristics of interest into a unique variable (the propensity score), making the matching procedure much more
feasible.
Thus, the propensity score arises as the probability of receiving a particular treatment, given certain values
of baseline characteristics: p(X) = Pr(exposureit = 1|X) . Using this deﬁnition as standpoint, the potential
outcomes framework presented in Appendix A.1. can be now expressed in the following manner:
power1it, power0it ⊥ exposureit|p(Xi)
Thus, E(power0it|p(Xi); exposureit = 1) = E(power0it|p(Xi); exposureit = 0) and consequently:
AIT = E[Δit] = E[power1it|exposureit = 1]− E[power0it|exposureit = 0].
Once propensity scores of treated and untreated households have been obtained, diﬀerent algorithms can be
used in order to perform the matching. In particular, this paper has opted for using a Kernel algorithm, which
uses uses weighted averages of all households in the control group and inside the common support region to
construct the counterfactual outcome in the following manner:
wi,j =
K(Xi−Xj)
N0∑
k=1
K(Xi−Xk)
where i refers to a household in the treatment group; j indicates belonging to the control group; N0is the number
of households in the control group; and K is a Kernel function.
Two are the major advantages of using a Kernel algorithm as matching procedure. First, by using information
from a wide range of households within the control group, a lower estimation variance can be obtained, which
facilitates the obtainment of statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects. Furthermore, this algorithm is especially
suitable for the additional implementation of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, as it has been suggested by the
economic literature. Indeed, when both methodologies are simultaneously applied for the estimation of treatment
eﬀects32 this matching algorithm facilitates the obtainment of considerably consistent impact estimates in the
following manner:
ˆEffectmatching,DiD =
1
N1
N1∑
i=1
[(power1i,2005 − power0i,2002)−
N0∑
j=1
wi,j(power0j,2005 − power0j,2002)]
31Curse of dimensionality.
32As in Section 5.3.1.
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